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ABSTRACT
Manufacturing is the primary driver of major wealth formation and 
competitiveness in every significant economy. Therefore, it would appear that the more 
dominant role in manufacturing plays in overall Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the 
greater is the annual comparative growth rate o f the economy. Manufacturing is 19 
percent o f GDP for the United States, 30 percent for Japan, 31 percent for Korea, and 35 
percent for Germany, as o f 1987.
The term "manufacturing" as used here does not include construction, mining, 
forestry, fishing and other similar activities. There are two general definitions (See 
footnote, OECD/2/World Bank. U.N. SNA).
This paper contends that manufacturing, as a percent o f GDP, is a 
disproportionately significant contributor to national wealth and competitiveness. For 
example, the percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the United States is only 
two-thirds o f Japan's and about fifty-five percent o f Germany's. On the international 
scale, both Germany and Japan enjoy faster growth, the greater prosperity, the stronger 
currencies and also the greatest export market volume.
This paper further considers the linkages that are compliments to manufacturing. 
The author contends that manufacturing is the economic wellspring o f leading nations' 
progress, around which most other economic segments support and enhance. 
Manufacturing drives the entire economy. When considering the upstream and 
downstream services o f a country and the infrastructure necessary to make manufacturing
effective, it is calculated that in the United States over fifty percent of the GDP is 
attributable to manufacturing and manufacturing-generated activity. Without 
manufacturing, much of the upstream and downstream services would be unnecessary. 
Therefore, in addition to the idea that manufacturing is the most profitable sector o f the 
economy, manufacturing is also the one sector in which there is the greatest synergy for 
increasing the general prosperity of society.
This paper postulates that there is a positive correlation between the percentage o f  
manufacturing and the prosperity level of the total economy [Economic Report o f the 
President 1993], The corollary of this proposition is that there is not a similar positive 
correlation to services. Therefore, it follows that as the percentage o f manufacturing 
increases, so does GDP. However, as the percentage o f services increase, if  
manufacturing does not follow, then the GDP does not necessarily go up or at least not at 
the same rate. This clearly implies that manufacturing is the driver of prosperity, as well 
as the integrating factor that makes many sectors o f the economy more productive.
In summary, the conclusions from this paper are as follow:
1. That manufacturing is the most profitable sector o f the economy that increased 
GDP (individual prosperity and wealth) on a continuing basis.
2. That the nations with the highest manufacturing percentage to GDP, grow fastest, 
and become wealthy quicker.
3. That manufacturing is a nexus, or the tent pole, in the center ring o f the economic 
tent upon which everything else is driven and supported, financially and 
economically. By analogy, the higher and thicker the pole (manufacturing base), 
the larger the tent (economy) that can be supported.
x
If manufacturing capacity is exported, the technical capabilities will be exported 
as well, and incremental technical improvements will not occur. Thus, to export 
significant manufacturing capacity (plant, equipment, and technology) will lead to 
productivity obsolescence and impotence, and a less vigorous and prosperous 
economy.
I. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE
Each government in the world is concerned with the quality and adequacy o f  
meeting the needs of its people. Therefore, it is not surprising that all national leaders 
seek to assure the social, financial, and cultural stability and growth for the people o f  
their nations.
Financial and economic stability and growth are concerns due to their impact on 
the gross domestic product (GDP). They improve family stability, social benefits, and 
presumably create a more stable, more productive, happier society. Since national leaders 
are interested in determinants of economic growth for the betterment o f their nations, 
there are continuing efforts by academics and political scientists to determine what causes 
growth to accelerate, what causes growth to stop or slow down, and what retards growth 
as it relates to a given economy.
Worldwide, three kinds of societies exist. Each type o f society attempts to answer 
the questions o f resource allocation and growth objectives consistent with their goals and 
values. The three types o f societies are:
1. Traditional society: This is basically an agricultural one in which people live 
at or near a survival level.
2. "Emerging" and newly industrialized (NIC) society: Nations who have begun 
to industrialize fit into this category.
1
3. Mature industrial society: unfortunately these societies have been labeled 
called "post industrial, economies". The word "post-industrial" is a 
misnomer. The concept emerged sometime during the 1970s. The basis o f  
the definition of “post-industrial” is that more than fifty percent o f the 
economy comes from services. Even the most highly industrialized and 
prosperous mature societies fit this criteria. Japan and South Korea are, thus, 
post-industrial by this measure. They only have a contribution o f GDP from 
manufacturing of 30-35 percent versus services o f 50 plus percent. Thus, to 
use the percent of services above 50 percent as a standard for labeling an 
economy as "post-industrial" is a serious misnomer.
This paper seeks to do some statistical evaluation o f growth in mature industrial 
societies. This paper will include a list o f societies and nations for identification purposes 
to show the varying classifications among them. Each o f the nations chosen for 
evaluation fit into the third category. These nations are called the "Gang o f Seven" (G-7) 
in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
This paper identifies nineteen countries o f which only seven, all in the third 
category, will be analyzed in detail. The question this paper asks is "What is the impact 
of manufacturing on the economic growth o f a country?" The thesis which this paper 
propounds and investigates is that manufacturing is the most significant contributor to 
economic growth o f a country. It is hypothesized that the industrially mature country 
with the highest percentage of manufacturing to GDP in its economy will grow fastest 
when compared to other countries, other things being equal. Over time, as a result o f  this 
faster growth, that country will generate more wealth than other countries. The
2
conducive to promoting manufacturing as an increasing percentage of GDP in the 
economy as compared to international competitors. If a nation wants to stay 
economically competitive internationally, it is important that it achieve an equivalent or 
higher than average percent of manufacturing in its economy relative to other competitor 
countries. A country must at least match the percent of its GDP in manufacturing as its 
principal international competitors.
The countries identified as traditional economies in this study are Bangladesh, 
the Philippines, Pakistan, and Sudan. The intermediate category, or newly industrialized 
countries (NICs), are Brazil, Columbia, India, Indonesia, South Korea (which is almost 
fully industrialized), Turkey, and Thailand. The group that comprises the principal 
economic leaders in the world are members of the Organization o f Economic Cooperation 
for Development Countries (OECD) which includes Canada, France, West Germany 
(some data on West Germany is either missing or misleading), Italy, Japan, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom (Table 1.1).
The stated thesis o f this paper is that an increased percentage o f manufacturing 
over that o f international competitors makes the economy o f a country grow faster than 
its competitors and, consequently, increases the wealth o f that nation faster than its 
international competitors. This thesis is derived from economic growth theory. There 
are, o f course, several growth theories beginning with the classical, the neoclassical, the 
Keynesian, and the post-Keynesian work o f Dennison and Juergenson. These varied
3
Tab
le 
1.1 
Or
ga
niz
ati
on
 f
or 
Ec
on
om
ic 
Co
op
era
tio
n 
and
 D
ev
elo
pm
en
t C
ou
ntr
ies
 & 
Oth
er 
Ge
ne
ral
 S
tat
ist
ics
Ind
ust
ry 
Pro
du
ct 
Ind
ex 
(19
80
- 
10
0%
)
(XI - 122 o 104 107 •oto vO mo
I 
zz\ soroCN
»nVO 29
6
95 o © 184 Os
Ma
nu
fac
­
tur
ing
 % 
of
GD
P
00 26 23 22 32 r- o o 29 30 so 23 CN o 24 26 22 as
% 
La
bo
r 
For
ce 
in 
Ind
ust
ry
10
.7
15
.8 19.
5
21
.6
20
.6
32
.6 od 9.8 20
.4
24.
1 vO
K
CM 14
.0 o
d 25
.0 o
d
o
© 13
.5
21
.0
20
.3
To
tal
 In
d. 
Pro
du
ct 
% 
of
GD
P
00 29 26 30 25
6 32 cn 27 28 33 35 20 26 TOCO o 30 32 27 27
% 
La
bo
r 
For
ce 
in 
Ag
ric
ult
ure
57
.0 2.5 4.9 6.7 4.8 od 54
.0
Os 8.0 21
.0
49
.0 o
d 14
.0 ©
d
©
©
©
d
r f
o
CN 3
.0
Ag
ric
ult
ure
 
Pro
duc
tio
n 
%
of 
GD
P
49 o m
C-
- 27 26 cn 23 in © vO CN CN
Per
 C
ap
ita
GD
PS
18
0
2,3
06
16
,2
00 Oso
CN
15
,8
54 T fmrn
©o 31
7
40
5
13
,20
5
19
,4
71
2,8
80 35
5
59
3
2,4
39 39
8
89
3 inOs
CN 12
,09
6
00
Lo
ng
-T
erm
Ch
an
ge
GD
P% 3.7 3.3 3.2 ©rn vq SO' 5.5 3.6 2.0 3.8 8.6
■ 
6.7
/—*s
§ni - c ?
VO
&n
m
in
vp . 
CN
CN
d
GD
P(I
n 
Mi
llio
ns 
of
U.S
. S
)
19
,2
27
32
6,2
50
41
9,
12
2
36
,18
9
88
1,4
50
1 ,
11
6,
16
1
25
4,2
03 soso
Os
vo 75
5,8
65
r *o
rn
o f
12
1,3
10 CO
os'
CN 34
,38
7
80
,51
8
9,1
97
47
,59
6
68
,00
7 r *CN
TO
TO
VO 4,4
72
,91
0
198
7 
Po
pu
lat
ion
 
(In 
Mi
llio
ns)
©
CNo
-
in
CN
Os
CN
SO'
in
in VO TOr -
p
CN
r - Kin
( 
12
2.0 sq
( 
10
2.2 o
»n
p
cn
cn CN
©
m
cn
in
©
VO
in
Ov
CO
CN
Co
un
try
JS
<D
-o
J 2
ob
CQ
H j
Br
azi
l-2
Ca
na
da
-3*
Co
lum
bia
-2
Fr
an
ce-
3*
*
f#-,
c
COE1=3
<u
o
CN
. 2
c
CN
.2■—
<uc
O
T3
C
♦
m
ea Jap
an
-3* ni«3
<UU,o
c
3
• icu
c/j
<uc
'c u
1ca* Sou
th 
Afr
ica
-3 
|
c
es*0300
CN
-O
M’3
JG
f—1
CN
<u
Im3
H
*
to
i
b
*
m
•
<
oo
b
4
♦C
oun
trie
s 
ana
lyz
ed 
in 
this
 p
ap
er
Wo
rld
 S
tat
isti
cs 
in 
Br
ief,
 U
nite
d 
Na
tio
ns 
Sta
tist
ica
l P
ock
etb
ook
, 1
3̂ 
ed.
theories are discussed in the survey of growth theory and include works by Karl Shell1; 
Stanislaw Gromulka2; Simon Smith Kuznets3; W. A. Eltis4; R. M. Sundrum5; Edmon 
Malinvaud6; and Halevi, Joseph, Laibman D, and Edward J. Nell.7
Most discussions of growth theory in this paper are based on the summarized 
works o f many authors. This summary was synthesized by Kwang Choi (1983) in his 
book, Theories of Comparative Economic Growth.
In summary, all nations seek to continuously improve their economic performance 
in order to insure their citizens a stable, peaceful, and increasingly prosperous life 
environment. The academic study of tools to accomplish this goal is called growth 
theory. The purpose of this research is to suggest that while growth theory does not look 
at the question o f economic growth the way this paper looks at it, the predictor o f the 
fastest growth economies are those that have the highest percentage o f manufacturing to 
gross domestic product. This paper does not go into all the theoretical bases as to why 
there is more manufacturing in one nation than another, but recognizes manufacturing as 
a determinant o f rate of growth and seeks to prove this thesis.
'Shell, Karl, “Favorites of Fortune: Technology, Growth and Economic Development Since the Industrial 
Revolution.” MIT Press, 1967, p. 303.
2 Gromulka, Stanslaw. “The Theory of Technical Change and Economic Growth.” London: Routledge, 
1990, p. 262.
3 Keznets, Simon Smith. “Toward a Theory of Economic Growth, With Reflection On The Economic 
Growth of Modem Nations.” New York: Norton Library,. 1968, p. 122.
4 Eltis, W. A. “The Classical Theory of Economic Growth.” New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984, p. 372.
5 Sundrum, R. M. “Economic Growth in Theory and Practice.” New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990, p. 303.
6 Malinvaud, Edmond. “Activity Analysis in the Theory of Growth and Planning.” MacMillian, 1967, p. 
334.
7 Halevi, Joseph, Laibman, D. and Nell, Edward, J. “Beyond the Steady State: A Revival of Growth 
Theory.” New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992, p. 274.
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II. LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY AND EXCLUSIONS 
FROM CONSIDERATIONS OF THIS STUDY
In doing this study, there are certain exclusions that have to be made. Table 2.1 
shows some countries that have received considerable media coverage over the last 
twenty-five years; but it is the author's conclusion that these countries are not significant 
lto the questions raised in this study.
The second exclusion is the type of questions that will be dealt with in this paper. 
One o f the things that will not be dealt with is "government as a retardant" to economical 
growth. Another subject that will only be minimally discussed is "Convergence Theory 
of Growth." It is not relevant to the principle data contained in this paper and is shown in 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2. The reason is that the persistence of the different rates o f 
manufacturing and GDP are reasonably constant after the countries have reached the 
convergency in economic growth.
Another issue not considered in this research effort is the neo-classical idea o f 
equilibrium over time. It appears that there can be equilibrium over time. The only 
problem is that it may take forever to reach equilibrium in the neo-classical model. Many 
people can be disrupted and may even starve in the meantime. For this reason, Keynes' 
work largely spoke to the issue o f disequilibrium in terms of his demand theory with an 
emphasis on short-run macroeconomics approaches. These issues are beyond the scope 
of this particular paper and will not be dealt with here. A further limitation to this paper
6
Figures 2.1 and 2.2
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8
is that it does not consider the export bias for growth that is a considerable factor in 
several economies.
Finally, the question of different types of investment, long-term versus short-term, 
and targeting that investment are potentially important issues in growth theory. The type 
of investment could be research and development at the fundamental level or in 
manufacturing machinery, etc. It is clear from an earlier study done by the U.S. Air 
Force in the early 1980s that investment in production equipment in Japan shows the 
average age o f equipment is eight years old. However, the average age is fifteen years for 
similar equipment in the United States. This question of age and quality of the capital 
stock is also beyond this study.
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature search questioning the subject matter o f growth theory has indicated 
the sources noted in the latter part of the last chapter. However, the great thrust o f this 
paper is based on the survey work done by Kwang Choi in his “Theories o f Economic 
Growth” (1983). This work was updated at a "Symposium on Long-Term Economic 
Growth" (1992) sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. The Symposium 
papers will be reviewed, summarized and analyzed throughout this study.
In the United States, growth theory received a major impetus from at least three 
significant contributors. The first was the Full Employment Act o f 1946. The second 
was Robert Solow's growth model published in the late 1950s. The third is the work o f  
Dennison and Maddison that clarified and expanded the contributions by Solow.
More recently, Romer has refined some of those thoughts; however, there are still 
many other approaches to growth theory that have not been well explained or seriously 
considered. An example is the “Role of Manufacturing in the Future Life Of An 
Industrialized Economy” which is a summary o f the book Manufacturing Matters 
(Cohen and Zysman, 1987).
Let us now consider growth theory in terms o f its evolution. Most o f this 
discussion is based on the summaries by Kwang Choi (1983).
The object o f growth theory is to attempt to determine what are the critical factors 
that cause or retard economic growth. Presuming once these were known, then a society 
can focus or target its resources to support those segments o f the economy that will assure
10
the desired growth level for the entire economy. Table 3.1 has comparative statistics on 
productivity growth and productivity level. It shows two figures—growth per capita GDP 
and the level o f productivity. The United States is used as the productivity benchmark of 
one hundred. This table shows Germany with a growth rate twice that of the U.S. and 
Japan four and one-haif times that of the U.S. for the period from 1950 to 1978. Also 
note that Figures 2.1 and 2.2 in Chapter II illustrate the convergence question raised by 
Table 3.1.
Table 3.2 shows sources of growth of total national income from 1950 to 1962. 
The table suggests the sources of the contribution to growth in discrete numbers and in 
percent contribution. This table creates the delightful illusion that the sources o f  
productivity growth are easily, accurately and totally identifiable in exact numbers. The 
following discussion o f theory will illustrate how untrue that illusion is based on the 
current state o f knowledge. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 are benchmarks to discuss the question o f 
impact on manufacturing on the growth of GDP for the nineteen nations listed earlier.
Growth theory is concerned with explaining today's reality and predicting the 
future. Otherwise, growth theory has little use, if any. Predictive use is based on 
understanding the causation o f and the relative magnitude o f impact of the elements in the 
instant picture.
A major problem with all o f these theories is they have considerable difficulty in 
identifying cause and effect. These theories cannot determine whether the effect is the 
cause or the cause is the effect. This is one of the key elements o f proof that will be dealt 
with later in the paper. As a preview, it is clear from the statistical work that there is a 
direct relationship between the percent of manufacturing in GDP and the growth rate o f
11
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Table 3.3
Rates o f  Productivity Growth by Decade
Economy 1950-60 1960-69 1969-79 1979-90 1985-91
United States 2.0 2.5 .5 13 1.2
Japan 6.7 8.4 4.4 3.0 3.8
Germany 6.4 43 2.5 1.6 2.9
France 43 4.8 2.8 13 1.9
U.K. 2.5 23 23 1.7 1.8
Canada 1.8 2.6 1 1.2 1.0
Italy 6.0 5.2 3.7 1.9 23
Total OECD* |  3.0 3.5 1.8 1.6
Industrial Pacific Rim 
Economies*
6.7 6.2 4.4 3.6
Industrial Latin
American
Economies**
21 2.8 23 -1.7
Avg. Industrial 
Economy
33 3.7 2.4 1.0
*Total OECD product divided by number of OECD workers.
+Our list o f industrialized Pacific Rim economies initially includes only Japan. Hong 
Kong and Singapore join th elist in 1960. Korea, Malaysia, and the economy o f the 
Taiwan province are added to the list in 1979.
++Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Source: DeLong and Summers, p. 96 Macroeconomic Policy and Long Run Growth 
(1992). From ‘‘Policies for Long Run Economic Growth”— A Symposium 
sponsored by The Federal Reserve Bank o f Kansas City, 1992.
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Figure 3.2
Cyclically Adjusted Real GDP Per Worker Growth 
Centered Five-Year Moving Averages
Percent
Source: DeLong and Summers, p. 97 Macroeconomic Policy and Long Run Growth (1992). 
From “Policies for Long Run Economic Growth”—A Symposium sponsored by The 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 1992
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the economy. Whether this can be structured into a theory that manufacturing causes the 
economy to grow or the economy Table 3.1 causes manufacturing to grow is not yet 
clear. However, as one goes up the other goes up, or, conversely, goes down.
This paper hypothesizes that manufacturing is the primary and major driver o f  
wealth growth in an economy. Note that the two other principal highly prosperous 
economies in the world, Germany and Japan, have not taken the notion o f the post­
industrial society to heart. As noted by the UN's World Statistics in Brief, 1990, HA42- 
.U58 (13th ed.), manufacturing is 33 percent of GDP in Germany, 29 percent in Japan, 
and only 19 percent in the U.S (South Korea has 30%).
Japan has enormously enhanced its domestic production capability with high 
investment. To some extent, it has "off-shored," i.e., produced externally all but the core 
production, from Japan. Another example is Germany which is highly integrated and an 
excellent producer of metal products. Germany is not off-shoring production, because 
that production is the result o f a very tightly integrated educational and technical system 
that is continually refining the ability to handle metals. Those skills are not easily 
exportable. The third example is Korea. Because Korea is short o f capital, it has 
allocated segments of its economy to certain producers. However, it should be noted that 
the percentage o f manufacturing to GDP of Japan, West Germany, and South Korea is 
approximately 50 percent higher than that of the United States. Korea's manufacturing 
output is 31 percent o f GDP versus 19 percent o f that o f the U.S. and is similar to 
percentage contribution in Japan (29 percent) and Germany (33 percent) o f GDP 
generated by manufacturing during 1987 (World Statistics in Brief, U.N., 1990).
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Let us now review the various theories of growth as contained in the survey by 
Choi and the symposium at Jackson Hole on long-term economical growth policy 
considerations. In discussing economic growth, it is essential to first define the term 
“economic growth”. Economic growth is "a sustained increase either in real per capita 
income or in real total income but not limited to growth o f output per head and considers 
the growth o f the total real income" (Choi, pg. 7). Other definitions, similar in nature 
were also found .8
Economic growth is to be distinguished from economic development. Economic 
development is the structural mechanism for achieving economic growth. Economic 
growth really describes the result o f this mechanism. This definition o f economic growth 
is further limited by considering only the production oriented or activity o f economic 
growth. It does not attempt to deal with the welfare benefit or social account indicators. 
To date, no one has been able to measure these factors effectively.
A further caution in dealing with economic growth is that we are never comparing 
two identical phenomena. As Choi (1983) pointed out, no two countries are identical, 
even though they may be free enterprise representative government type economies. This 
limitation, plus the limitations o f natural endowments in terms o f geography, climate, 
minerals, and transportation (i.e. natural waterways, harbors, flatlands, easy movement, 
etc.), means that regardless o f attempted comparisons o f these influences, their impacts
8Survey o f Social Sciences Economic Series, p. 948
ECONOMIC GROWTH: The economic process of reproduction and replication relegated to the 
quantitative statics of producing more and more of a given structure.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: The economic process of transformation relegated to the qualitative 
dynamics of structural change.
See also MIT Dictionary of Economics 4th ed., 1992, pp. 119-120.
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are not clearly reflected. Not withstanding any numerical errors of data collection, 
measurements are less then perfect due to these yet unquantifiable phenomena.
The data comparisons have inherent flaws in any economic study (particularly in 
growth theory) because of problems of data comparability, data completeness, and 
accuracy. An analysis shows that, even among OECD countries, data falls into two 
categories o f quality. The United States and France are at the top tier, but some o f the 
other countries’ data were not good (Summers and Heston 1991). For the newly 
industrialized countries' (NIC’s) data ranges from very poor to non-existent. The ultimate 
problems o f inaccurate, incomplete, and immeasurable factors in data further constrain 
the clarity o f focus and the accuracy and validity of conclusions based on the low  
confidence levels o f data.
Still another problem is applying the economic theory that it is never possible to 
prove economic hypotheses by empirical analysis in the strictest sense. The same result 
probably could be explained by other phenomena (i.e., Sunspot Activity). Additionally 
sometimes there is confusion as to what is cause and/or effect. A historical example o f 
this is the situation in times past in India. It was generally theorized that overpopulation 
caused starvation. After subsequent study, it turned out that starvation was found to be 
the cause o f over population. It was determined that starving people tried to reproduce so 
they would have more children to support them as they grew older. Earlier analysis had 
supports the converse view. Therefore, the question of cause and effect is a critical 
problem in a testing o f economic theory and developing a workable hypothesis.
This next section examines manufacturing as the principle engine o f economical 
growth. Like economic growth, the definition of manufacturing is not uniform across
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nations. We will attempt to use some of Professor Nicholas Kaldor's theory, technique, 
and formula to come to grips with this question. As noted earlier, drags on economic 
growth will not be explicitly considered in this study.
Early Classical Growth Theory
There are several early theories of economic growth. Adam Smith viewed the 
economic growth from the supply side. Early on, Simon Kuznets (Choi 1983) observed 
that there are so many different growth processes in the world that a general theory is 
disputable. With this in mind, the theories vary because o f changes in the emphasis/ 
importance of the various factors and their interrelationships.
To begin with, there is a classical theory and a modem theory. The classical 
theory attempts to capture the essence of the process for all societies over the entire time 
span. This necessarily includes economic questions, in addition to those o f political, 
sociological, and psychological questions as well. The principle classic theorists o f this 
school are Ricardo, Mill, Smith, and Malthus. More recently, as a result o f Keynes's 
work, there is a modem theory which works from the demand side o f the consideration of 
economic growth.
The classical theory originated with Adam Smith. Smith was greatly concerned 
with the drivers o f growth and based his growth theory on the division o f labor to in­
crease economies o f output. His theory sees the key to growth as increasing supply rather 
than increasing demand. Smith further indicated that increasing demand arises mostly 
from international demand. Clearly he emphasizes the role o f capital in this process. His 
presumption is that workers have no capacity to save. Smith, therefore, divides capital 
into three areas, immediate consumption, used in commerce, and that invested in
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production capabilities. His theory is keyed to a rudimentary society where there is 
agriculture, manufacturing, distribution, and transportation. This theory also keys its 
thinking to the seesaw balance of applying only as long as output grows faster than 
consumption per unit. A corollary to this is that growth occurred where the output grows 
faster than the wage rate. (Choi 1983).
Ricardo postulates that growth will occur as long as the population grows, rules o f  
denomination apply, and capital accumulation occurs (Choi 1983). This is still another 
refinement o f the general classical theory.
Still others such as Domar and Harrod essentially state that they follow the 
Keynesian or demand-driven framework. However, they look at the capacity to create 
capital as a primary driver o f economic growth. Both theorists recognize the problem of 
equilibrium and full employment. Domar sees it as underinvestment. Harrod sees it as a 
mismatch o f the growth o f labor availability as it relates to total demand, which he said 
was not the constant. These theorists have generated such interest that they have 
obviously caused a split in thinking. One view is based on the idea that there is price 
flexibility which generates full employment and creates equality between savings and 
investment. The other thrust o f this diverse group o f thinking harkens back to the 
thinking o f Ricardo.
The neo-classical theory o f economic growth assumes a well-behaved aggregate 
production function which is sustainable over time. It further presumes a substitution 
effect between capital and labor. However, it does recognize instability that changes 
interest rates which, in turn, changes labor involvement. As shown in Figure 3.1, the
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classic formula which is elementary to the neo-classical growth theory, output equals the 
factor of capital times labor (Choi 1983).
Figure 3.1
Figure 2.1 (Based on Baumol 1970, Chap. 2) 
Source Choi, 1983, p. 20.
We now turn to the neo-Keynesian model which is driven by the demand 
function. Within this school are Nicholas Kaldor, Joan Robinson, Piero Sraffa, and 
Richard F. Kahn. At first, the neo-Keynesian model starts with the aggregate saving 
depending essentially on the distribution of income. It notes that workers save for 
different reasons than capitalists. Since capital belongs to the investors, they have the 
ability to save more than the workers do. This theory considers the distribution of 
income as the variable that links the rate of economic growth. This is in contrast to the 
neo-classical theory where the distribution o f income is ignored or assumed to be the 
result o f technical conditions of the production function. Keynes thinks that the 
economic growth and the sharing of income are driven by the same force which is the rate 
of investment. In contrast to the classical theorists, Keynesians do not consider capital 
stock as a continuous input and actually regard the capital input as being controlled by 
technical conditions.
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Keynesians maintain that growth is driven from the rate of investment because 
this is how much new profitable industries are going to expand in their capabilities (Choi 
1983). They further theorize that there is a self-exciting cycle of capital. The more 
capital you put in, the higher the investment ratios; that is, the rate o f return goes up. 
Probably most significantly, the Keynesians look at the causality involved, investment 
determines savings. Therefore, the adjustment and distribution o f income are the rates o f 
profit that determines the marginal product of capital.
Robinson's characterization of a neo-Keynesian paradigm suggests that human 
behavior is not rational and investment is driven by "animal instincts," thus making 
investment rate unpredictable.
Kaldor, who follows the same general theory, puts more emphasis on the macro 
aspects o f the model, whereas Robinson thinks of the micro aspects. Kaldor assumes full 
employment and does not believe there is a distinction between long-term and short-term 
effects. (Choi 1983). Kaldor believed in long-term stability and Robinson does not.
There are differences in their methodology in terms of pricing, profit rate determination, 
and analytical technique of progress, i.e., how to evaluate capital and how growth is 
sustained in their models. Further, Kaldor builds abstract models and keys them to 
structural facts for ease o f use. Robinson’s model does not provide a predictive model, 
only a framework for looking at different types of growth, which explains the conditions 
of accumulation.
Kaldor's writings started in the mid-1950s and continued through the 1970s.
(Choi 1983) Kaldor saw six anchor points or drivers o f an industrial economy:
1. continued growth of aggregates, production, and labor productivity
2. continued increase in the amounts of capital per worker
3. a steady rate of profits on capital
4. a steady capital output ratio over long periods
5. a high correlation between profit sharing and income and a share o f investment
and output; and
6. the appreciable differences in the rate of growth of labor productivity and total
output in different societies.
Kaldor cautioned the reader that these facts cannot be explained by the theoretical 
construct o f the neo-classical theory! He made savings accommodate to the desired 
investment level through the increase in the shared profits in international income. This 
idea is based on the Keynesian alternative theory of distribution but is fundamental to 
Kaldor's modeling. Kaldor's modeling characterizes savings out o f profits or out o f 
wages and compounds the total savings inputs.
Kaldor ties together the relationships between growth, investment, and technical 
progress. (Choi 1983) He postulated that technical progress is not exogenous but 
depends on the rate of capital accumulation. Most critics argue that these neo-Keynesian 
growth models are not ordered and therefore, their analysis is more nearly a topology 
than a theory o f economic growth. Kaldor is an exception to this. He created and 
presented a well-ordered model.
The next general group of growth theory behavior arises from the source o f 
growth analysis efforts, which began in the mid-1950s. Robert Solow was the principle 
contributor and won a Nobel Prize for his efforts. The premise o f this theory is based on
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the neo-classical conception ol the aggregate production Function and highlighted the 
supply conditions tor economic growth. There is an endless list o f authors writing in this 
area, probably the most notable are Kendrick. Dennison and more persistently Dale W. 
Jorgenson. They proceed with a descriptive analysis that may be characterized as 
"growth accounting." Growth accounting identifies, but does not necessarily explain 
output growth.
Solow's contribution deals with attempting to predict the impact of a capital 
accumulation on growth in the United States from 1909 to 1949. (Choi, p. 51) The 
classic equation in Solow's thinking is
a = a  -  3 vg  7y  <
where GY is the growth rate o f worker output and G,Kk is the growth o f capital per 
worker. The great weakness o f his model is that between 80 percent and 85 percent o f  
total growth is due to "technological change" which is called a "residual." Therefore, 
Solow's model really only directly predicts about 15 percent to 20 percent of the impact 
driving growth.
Dennison extends these studies by broadening his study of countries (Choi, 1983). 
His results were shown earlier in Table 3.2. One of Dennison's conclusions is that 
contribution to output by capital is less than a quarter of the total in all o f the countries he 
examined. His formula failed to allow for the fact that the acceleration rate o f investment 
brings with it the acceleration of the rate of efficiency of capital stock increase. Dennison 
and Solow think that technical change is not assumed to be embodied in new investment
24
The last and probably the most comprehensive approach to this line o f thinking is 
done by Jorgenson. He uses a different formula to calculate technical change and argues 
that it is necessary to distinguish stocks and flows as between stock prices and flow  
prices. Jorgenson thinks capital services, not capital stocks, should be in the production 
function. By doing these adjustments, the unexplained portion of growth is almost non­
existent. There is 97 percent predictability and only 3 percent are unexplained! This 
represents a great improvement in predictability of the contribution o f input factors.
Growth accounting is limited by the idea that really is not a theory. Growth 
accounting describes growth, but the author Choi (p. 56) does not think that it explains 
growth. Choi considers it only the first step of getting to the cause o f growth. He cites 
the misleading factors from countries' growth that do not follow the rules that this 
suggests. Choi thinks that the real causes of growth will be unknown and hypothesizes 
that growth accounting merely is descriptive and does not show relationships. Because 
the causal relationship -is missing, Choi does not consider growth accounting a theory o f 
growth, but just a mechanism to recognize a status. (Choi 1983)
Earlier the author o f this paper indicated that the concept o f the catch up 
hypothesis resulted in what is called "convergence" or equivalent status o f the factors o f 
inputs at some point o f maturity o f the economy, as an explanation o f economic growth, 
and is not considered in this paper (See Figures 3.1 and 3.2). Simply stated, Figure 3.1 
shows that after 1975, catch up should have been complete among the World War II 
devastated nations o f Japan, Germany, and others. The rates o f relative manufacturing to 
GNP continue to be relatively constant after 1975. Therefore, this suggests that this 
constancy disproves the notion o f convergence at least from 1975 on, for at least OECD
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countries. Because of time constraints convergence, as a theory, will not be further 
considered in this paper.
Recent Developments in Economic Growth Theory 
The following review of growth theory is from a series of articles selectively 
noted from a symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank o f Kansas City at 
Jackson Hole, Wyoming in 1992. Three topics in particular are covered: (1) macro­
economics policy and growth, by Bradford and Summers, (2) investment policies to 
promote growth by Alan Auerbach, and (3) Human Capital, and Economic Growth by 
Robert J. Barro. This symposium discussion was published as a paperback book by the 
Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank entitled “Policies for Long-Term Economic Growth.” 
The objective of this conference was to look at the determinants of long-term 
economic growth and those things that would retard it in a mature industrial economy.
The first article o f major substance is “Macroeconomic Policy on Long Run Growth,” by 
Delong and Summers (1992). The second item o f significance is an article on investment 
polices to promote growth by Allen J. Auerbach Deputy Chief o f Staff, Joint Committee 
on Taxation. The third significant article in terms o f implications for national or 
economic growth is “Human Capital and Economic Growth”, by Robert J. Barro, 
professor, Harvard University.
The first article, "Macroeconomic Policy and Long-term Growth," is critiqued in 
the next section. The authors, in summary, posture that macro policy, o f course, is 
important for long-term growth and look at two particular links that they think are 
significant determinants o f growth. The first link is the independence o f the Central Bank 
that has the power to keep the inflation rate low and thus improves the functioning o f the
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market system. DeLong and Summers' research suggested that countries with the most 
independent Central Banks, the United States, Germany, and Switzerland, have the 
lowest average rates of inflation and, therefore, the average fastest rates of growth.
The second principle link is what, if any, damage is caused by recessions.
DeLong and Summers conclude that recessions do reduce investment and physical 
capital. They further found that monetary policy particularly was geared more to 
stabilizing an economy fighting recessions than working to raise long-term growth. They 
discussed reducing inflation to zero as it may impact on long-term growth. Their 
conclusion appears to be that low inflation, not zero inflation, is a good stimulant to long­
term growth because it creates interest cost stability. This makes the market system work 
more efficiently.
The second topic covered by both DeLong and Summers, as well as critiqued by 
Auerbach, discusses the question o f investment as it relates to long-term growth. 
Summers and DeLong suggest targeted investment considerations for such investment as 
production plant and equipment. They suggest that such targeting generates super returns 
and, therefore, moves the economy forward more quickly than would otherwise be the 
case. Auerbach raises the question about the linkage that proves investment leads to 
faster long-term growth. He suggests that economic models really do not spell out that 
connection. Auerbach also raises the question about how much growth comes from what 
are called "spillovers" and which kinds o f investments have the greatest spillover effect. 
In this series o f articles, tax incentives for savings and investment were both discussed. 
Martin Feldstein suggested that savings and investment incentives were productive. He 
also noted that the so-called personal savings rate was so low in the United States, it
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would still not meet the investment requirement. Second. Feldstein noted that the 
national savings rate does limit investment in the long run and, therefore, savings 
incentives and investment incentives may appear to reduce the tax take of the 
government. The output gained by increased growth generates more corporate tax 
revenues because of the increase in the capital stock, than the tax loss on savings, 
Feldstein postulates.
Others including Kudlow, Meltzer. and Walter thought that targeting investment 
incentives was not necessarily well designed and the market itself would resolve this. 
Meltzer also had the view that subsidized capital accumulation does perhaps raise 
productivity growth significantly, but significant reductions in trade barriers may well be 
more effective.
The last conceptual notion of consequence in this symposium was the impact o f  
human capital policies. (The fundamental notion of increasing the standard o f living is 
that productivity grows faster than wage rates. This is the underlying theme behind the 
discussion here, [and most economic discussions of raising the standard o f living as 
understood by this writer). The principle speaker or writer in this context was Robert 
Barro who supports the idea that human capital is important as a determinant o f growth. 
Barro's posture was validated by Katz's micro studies. Additionally, James Miller, III 
presented several policy ideas to accomplish this validation.
Barro found that growth was generally faster in countries with more human 
capital. He says human capital has several effects. Human capital increases growth by 
spurring investment. Physical capital increases wages and. therefore, raises opportunity 
cost of bearing children, which reduces the general size of families. Barro concludes that
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holding birth rates and investment constant, human capital still contributes positively to 
economic growth.
The studies of Barro and Katz show that industries with highly educated workers 
invest more heavily in new technology than others. Further, there are spillover effects 
from this activity so that the secondary workers are aiso beneficiaries o f the process and 
contribute to further increases in productivity rates.
The last significant note in terms o f human capital development is by Katz. He 
notes that higher education contributes to more equal distribution o f benefits o f growth. 
There is some discussion on the better distribution of non-college educated people in 
Europe and Japan versus the United States. Europe and Japan tend to have better 
technical training programs for people not educated at the college level, versus those 
people trained in officially structured education for crafts and trades skills in the United 
States.
A last thought by Miller regarding education is that it is one method to improve 
the United States's technical educational abilities. He suggests de-monopolizing primary 
and secondary education so that innovation through competitive sources (like the higher 
education system in the U.S.A.) could bring the educational attainment higher than under 
the current state monopoly of the primary and secondary school education system. Miller 
justified this by citing the example of the United States' higher education system, which 
is both private and public, and is the envy of the world. Miller also notes that our 
primary and secondary, education institutions lag behind the other leading nations o f the 
world in terms of effectiveness, even though the United States spends half again as much 
per student as does Europe and Japan. These notions and exhortations continue to
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reiterate the theme that increased investment embodying new technology and increased 
workers skills are two tremendously significant determinants o f economic growth.
This symposium's further concerns noted impediments/retardants to growth, such 
as recession, high inflation, and excessive tax burdens. These concerns absorbed what 
would otherwise be personal and corporate savings, which could, thus, increase growth.
These policy thoughts including specifically targeted super return investments, 
plant, and equipment lead us to the thesis o f this paper. What is the impact o f 
manufacturing on the growth rate of the economy versus other segments o f the economy, 
and is there a positive relationship of growth of manufacturing or manufacturing 
percentage to economic growth?
Critique of DeLong and Summers 
DeLong and Summers (1992) presented a summary report on the main findings o f 
the 1992 Federal Reserve symposium. This article dealt with the role o f macroeconomic 
policies in determining long-term rates of productivity growth. DeLong and Summers 
maintain that the principle concern of governments is the long-term trend o f productivity 
growth as a basis for improvement of living standards. They note that since 1973 there 
has been a productivity slow down in the so called mature countries (OECDs) o f the 
world. DeLong and Summers's first assumption is that those things which generate a 
rising growth rate lie in what is called "structural policy." since macroeconomic policies 
are less dominant in determining these rate of productivity growth. They then determine 
that there are two primary questions in macropolicy with respect to an economy. The 
first question is, how will aggregate demand be managed? The second question is, how  
will total output be divided up between the various forms of investment?
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DeLong and Summers identify their fundamental conclusions as a basis for 
discussing these issues. They note first that macroeconomic policies are not the primary 
drivers o f productivity growth, although a bad policy can impede it while a good policy 
does not necessarily enhance it. Their second general conclusion is that a stable 
monetary policy, which builds confidence in the central bank o f a country, greatly 
enhances price stability, which is a key consideration in the first o f two steps o f growth. 
The first goal of growth is stabilization. DeLong and Summers next note that social 
policy gains of 15 percent will only modestly affect productivity growth. However, very 
high social returns can come from specific investments, particularly in production 
machinery that can assist in turning the productivity slow down around to make it into an 
increasing productivity gain. Thus, equipment investment, which embodies new 
technology, is considered one o f the unique specialty investment mechanisms to help 
generate accelerated productivity growth.
In their paper, they consider four questions. The first looks at the record of 
productivity growth. The second, what is the role of nominal demand management 
policy? The third looks at investment rates and the rates of return, but does not deal with 
the question o f "capital productivity". The fourth looks at the question o f equipment 
investment to spur growth. DeLong and Summers note that the United States grew at a 
faster rate (2 percent) from 1950-1960,2.5 percent from 1960-1969, only .5 percent from 
1969-1979 and 1.4 percent from 1979-1990 (Table 3.3). They calculate that the reduction 
in productivity growth is 60 percent from the period 1950-1970 versus 1970-1990. As 
shown in Table 3.3, output doubled in 31 years at the 1950-1969 rate but at the 1969- 
1990 rate it would take 73 years to double output. This is much slower than historical
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experience, noting that the United States has not declined nearly as much as the OECD 
countries in general. From this table, DeLong and Summers built a Figure (3.2). This 
figure notes that the three principle countries are the United States, Germany and Japan in 
terms o f growth; and it makes clear that, up until 1975, both Germany and Japan grew 
much faster than the United States. Starting in 1975, both Germany and Japan declined 
considerably. However, their growth is still at least twice that of the United States 
according to this figure.
The enormous change from 1950 to 1975 and then from 1975 to 1990 is argued to 
be the result o f convergence effect. However, from 1975 forward, the convergence effect 
doesn't seem to be applicable. Figure 3.2 shows that Japan and Germany have a much 
higher growth rate than the United States. They experienced at least double the U.S. 
growth rate from 1975 to 1990.
When comparing Figure 3.2 with Figure 2.1, it shows that each o f these two 
countries have 50 percent more of their GDP generated by manufacturing than does the 
United States. While DeLong and Summers do not discuss this aspect o f the statistics, it 
appears to be clearly in support of this writer’s thesis. That is, the country that has the 
highest percent o f per capita, GDP in manufacturing grows faster than other countries. 
This chart convincingly illustrates that thought, thus proving this author’s essential thesis. 
DeLong and Summers’ discussion really makes no point of the oil embargoes in 1973 
and 1980. Figure 3.3 shows that there was a tremendous reduction in productivity when 
the oil embargoes hit. Productivity bottoms out in 1980 when there was another oil 
embargo. These points are not discussed at all by DeLong and Summers, although these
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exogenous acts of OPEC seem to have a compelling effect on the growth rates as 
indicated in Figure 3.3.
Delong and Summers suggest that the OPEC impact is not really the basis, 
because the rates of growth slowed down in the 1980s even when oil prices were slowing 
down after they had greatly risen in the 1970s. They also tried to discount the idea of 
inflation impact because the growth rates of the 1980s did not improve over the 1970s 
that had much higher inflation then the 1980s.
Figure 3.3
Cyclically Adjusted Real GDP Per Worker Growth 
Five-Year Moving Average for the OECD
Percent
4.0
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Source: DeLong and Summers, pg. 98. “Macro-economic Policy and Long Term 
Growth.” Symposium for Policies for Long Term Economic Growth.
Convergence-Adjusted Rate of Productivity Growth 
By Decade
Table 3.4
Economy 1950-60 1960-69 1969-79 1979-90 1985-91
United States 2.0 2.5 .5 1.4 1.2
Japan 3.7 5.7 2.3 1.8 3.0
Germany 4.0 2.4 1.1 .7 2.1
France 2.2 3.0 1.4 .3 1.0
U.K. ■ .8 .7 5 .3 3
Canada 1.3 2.1 ,2 .7 3
Italy 3.6 3.1 2.1 1.0 : :
TOTAL OECD 1.5 2.0 .6
............  !
i
Industrial Pacific Rim 
Economies
J.J 3.1 1.4 1.5
Industrial Latin 
American Economies
.0 .J -.4 -3.6
Average Industrial 
Economy
.9 1.6 .5 -.5
Source: DeLong and Summers, pg. 101. “Macro-economic Policy and Long Term 
Growth.” Symposium for Policies for Long Term Economic Growth.
Figure 3.4 shows a very interesting phenomena. It shows that in each time period 
from 1969 forward, after convergence had achieved its purposes in both Japan and 
Germany, there is still significantly higher growth rates than that of the United States. In 
the sequenced time 1985-1991, Germany had a 57 percent higher growth rate than the 
United States, that is 2.1 versus 1.2. Japan's was almost three times as great. Please note 
that Figures 1 and 2 show that Germany and Japan consistently have generated about 50 
percent more of their GDP by manufacturing than the United States and that this is 
mostly consistent with their higher growth rates.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show that most of the other OECD countries cluster around 
the manufacturing rate of the United States which is about 20 percent of GDP. Japan and
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Germany show 30 percent or 35 percent of GDP, respectively, arising from 
manufacturing. These differences in productivity in the manufacturing sector clearly 
suggest that the drivers of GDP growth are the differences in the proportion of 
manufacturing output to total GDP.
Up to this point, DeLong and Summers really do not say much about the effect of 
the increased percentage of GDP coming from export growth as a growth factor. They 
note on page 102 that alleged bad macropolicy in the United States in the 1980s did not 
make it slow down as much as in other OECD nations. DeLong and Summers ignore the 
fact that the United States ran up an extraordinary deficit during this time which may be a 
contributor to growth now but will have to be dealt with later. DeLong and Summers 
also talk about the limits of growth of technology, an interesting open question. This 
same point was made by a notable expert, Charles H. Duell, Commissioner, Office of 
U.S. Patents, in 1894. He said that the United States should close the Patent Office since 
"everything that can be invented has been invented."
DeLong and Summers turn their attention to theories that drive macro policies. 
They cite the fact that most nations are interested in stability and fighting inflation rather 
than in growth theory and, thus, their policies are concerned with maintaining full 
employment, based on aggregate demand. They note that long-term growth is driven by 
supply factors in theory and the accumulation of both physical and human capital and the 
technological progress that is embodied in new equipment.
DeLong and Summers note that there are two anchor points to their thinking with 
regard to the monetary policies. One is that more stable monetary environments have less 
inflation; and, therefore, the market economy system works better. They cite the danger
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of allowing recessions, in that they can do serious damage to human capital when there is 
long-term unemployment. The second anchor point is increased investments.
Figure 3.4 shows the general effect of the independence of central banks. The 
axiom DeLong and Summers advance is, the more independent central banks are, the 
more stable the nominal income of the society and the lower the rate of inflation. Figure 
3.4 seems to support this notion in terms of stability index. The authors conclude that an 
independent central bank reduces inflation, but does not increase high unemployment or 
slow growth. The authors note (p. 106) that there is no relation between central bank 
independence and GDP per worker growth as shown in Figure 3.5. Figure 3.6 suggests 
that central bank independence aids worker growth of productivity. Even though DeLong 
and Summers see this suggested correlation, they conclude that the central bank does not 
spur significant economic growth on its own! Other variables including investments are 
more dramatically important.
A corollary to their finding that stability of independent central banks allows the 
price system to work more effectively is that more politically sensitive systems in other 
countries does not really increase long term productivity growth. There is slight evidence 
that politically sensitive central banks may actually slow growth as indicated in Figure 
3.7 which shows that politically driven banks do hot lessen the cyclical variability of 
output, nor do they lead to lower rates of unemployment, thus reducing the recession 
effect. DeLong and Summers (p. 110) note that low inflation is probably better than no 
inflation. This suggests that zero inflation is too severe on the economy. They further 
note that low inflation does help to avoid the financial and real costs of a transition to 
zero inflation by allowing for interest rate adjustments and relative wages to be adjusted
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without changing the nominal wage. DeLong and Summers suggest that overcorrecting 
for inflation could increase a recession's impact.
Next, they turn to the question of increasing investment. Their thrust here is to 
look at the potential contribution of increased investment to economic growth. They note 
that only very high return investments or huge increases in investments have the potential 
to dramatically alter growth rates. They note that increased investments do not seem to 
generate much productivity growth by using growth accounting exercises to measure 
such growth, (p. 112)
Increased investment does have an impact on living standards. Even if 
investments were in the 15 percent return range, the first six of seven years of growth 
from this investment would be offset by the investment contribution. Increased demand 
would only occur in the seventh year of the investment's impact.
The authors conclude that the quality of investment is more important than the 
quantity. They suggest that the goal is to look for the highest return investments. They, 
however, do not discuss the concept of "capital productivity." {Economist, June 8, 1996, 
p. 82) The authors note that to get extraordinary investment returns is a structural 
microeconomic activity that is not within the concern of their paper. They do discuss 
providing very high returns by specialized investing. They note that deficit reduction 
really would not reverse a productivity slow down. The reduction in the deficit would be 
such that the growth from it would be less than the deficit reduction effect.
The authors note that general investments, while desirable, do not give the leap 
frog effect that they are attempting to deal with or to create in order to increase the 
productivity of the economy significantly and quickly. A particular statement is very
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Figure 3.4
Inflation and Central Bank Independence
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Source: pg. 105
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Figure 3.6
Central Bank Independence and Economic Growth. 
Controlling for Initial GDP Per Work Levels
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interesting. "The observations that economies do exhibit substantial differences in their 
rates of productivity growth, and that these differences must be a consequence of 
decisions about resource allocation, suggest that such high return investments do exist. 
The challenge for economic research for policies is to find them." (DeLong and 
Summers, 1992, p. 114)
The writer of this paper suggests that the source is quite obvious. It is the 
percentage manufacturing contributes to GDP9 The clear example can be found on 
DeLong and Summers' initial chart (Figure 3.2 Supra). This figure shows that both 
Germany and Japan have double the growth rate of the United States from 1980 to 1990 
and both have a 50 percent higher percent of their GDP generated from manufacturing. 
Therefore, a policy that matches the otherwise world leaders in manufacturing as a 
percent of GDP may well assure comparable growth. This author's thesis suggests 
matching the others (Germany and Japan) in terms of manufacturing percent of GDP 
should ensure an equivalent growth rate. Stated another wav, the country with the highest 
percent of manufacturing to GDP has the highest growth rate over time. The compliment 
to this is that those countries with the highest manufacturing rate also become richer, 
quicker than any one else.
Figure 3.8 shows the relationship between equipment investment and growth 
rates. The authors state that equipment investment has a very strong association with 
output per worker growth. For example, one extra percentage point devoted to 
investment in machinery and equipment generates a .26 percentage point per year growth. 
This impact is much higher than investments in non-machinery. Anecdotally, the United
9 It may also be due, in part, to capital productivity. Staff, Economist, pg. 82, June 8, 1996.
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Figure 3.8
Partial Scatterof 1965-80 Growth and 
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Table 3.5
Instrumental Variables Regressions of Growth 
On Machinery Investment
Instrument
Machinery
Investment
Other
Investment
Labor
Force
Growth
Produc­
tivity
Group
R l 
(2nd 
• stage) SEE n
No instruments .250
(.040)
.070
(.028)
-.030
(.126)
.034
(.006)
.652 .008 47
Savings rate .224
(.059)
.079
(0.34)
-.037
(.151) o 
o
 
O 
ui
OO 
—
w
*1
.507 .009 46
Relative price of 
machinery .2 1 0
(.086)
.092
(.045)
-.103
(.164)
.040
(.0 1 1 )
.610 .008 31
Tariffs and 
nontariff barriers 
on capital goods .196
(.136)
.077
(.048)
.016
(.028)
.027
(.0 1 1 )
.309 .011 3 9
Source: DeLong and Summers, pg. 120
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States Air Force did a study in the mid-1980s as to the average age machine tools in 
Japan versus the United States. The study showed that the average age of machine tools 
in Japan was seven years and the average age in the United States was fourteen years.
This confirms the results shown in Figure 3.8. It also confirms that Japan is three 
quarters of a percent greater in equipment investment than the United States.
Sadly, DeLong and Summers are back into the chicken-egg relationship argument. 
They raise the question that machinery and growth are correlated "not because an ample 
supply of machinery leads to fast growth, but because fast growth leads to a high demand 
from machinery”, (p. 118) This point should be subject to some further validation 
because this question will always arise. Which is the cause and which is the effect?
However, fortunately the authors do deal with this in a seeming satisfactory way. 
(p. 119) They concluded "supply and demand argument is powerful evidence that fast 
growth is not a cause but is an effect by a high rate of machinery investment". This, it 
seems, satisfies the chicken- egg questions earlier raised. Table 3.3 attempts to answer 
the question: "Is machinery purchased just a proxy for other unmeasurables that really do 
generate the high growth?" (p. 120) The evidence in the table seems to suggest that this 
is not true, it is not a proxy, but the cause. This is concluded in the author's comment that 
the similarities of association with growth of these different dimensions of variations in 
machinery investment provide powerful evidence that the machinerv-growth is structural. 
It does not arise in any large part because of high rated machinery investment. It is a 
signal that other growth-related factors are favorable. They conclude that because o f the 
consistency of the results shown in Figure 3.9, that an equipment investment is the
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important cause of growth not just a signal that indicates growth is coming from other
factors, (p. 100)
The essential conclusion of the authors here is that investment in machinery and 
equipment for manufacturing is the driver of super returns of growth and somehow 
should be granted additional inducements for investment. A stable monetary policy by 
an independent central bank coupled with a specialized investment in production 
machinery and equipment is probably the basis for generating a higher productivity 
growth rate than other techniques. This is largely proven by Figure 3.2. Even though 
their first chart does not identify the age of machinery in their equation, it is a fact that 
Japan's machine tool equipment is twice as new as is that of the United States; therefore, 
it has a higher investment as shown in Figure 3.8. This increased investment expands 
Japan's ability to reduce long-term average cost and obtain the benefits of economies of 
scale, disproportionate to others and, thus, captures market share, and increase 
profitability, as well as increased productivity, with newer equipment. This effect 
particularly enjoyed by Japan will be illustrated by other documentation later in this 
paper.
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Inverse Relationship Between Output Per Work Levels and 
Growth Rates in the Post-World War II Era
Figure 3.9
Percent
' Output per worker relative to U.S.
Source: DeLong and Summers, p. 100
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IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY & DATA SOURCES
The information used to test the question of the relationship of manufacturing to 
the growth of the economy is based on data base called the Penn World Table [Mark 5], 
and the World Bank Data Base. The Penn World Table was put together under the 
energies of Robert Summers and Alan Heston. It shows a set of national accounts and a 
time series covering a large number of countries from 1950 to 1988. The table creates a 
common set of prices in common currencies so real international comparisons can be 
made over time and between countries. The database allows inter-country comparisons 
because the data is presented in a common price or unit basis. (Summers and Heston 
1991).
This Penn-World Data Base is now in version number five and does a very 
interesting thing at the end of the table on page 364 and 365. The new Penn-World 
Tables rate the quality of data coming from various countries. The writer finds this to be 
quite useful in that there are significant variations in the quality of the data sets used in 
this study.
The approach to determining the impact of manufacturing on GDP growth across 
a variety of nations began by choosing nations that represent the three general categories 
of countries discussed earlier. The next step involved comparing GDP per capita per year 
for the selected countries starting in 1950 through 1990. Unfortunately good data were 
only available for the seven major OECD countries over this period. Therefore, all 
analytical work in this paper is limited to those seven countries. They are: Canada,
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France, Germany West, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and the United States. Two sectors 
of the economy and their relationships between them are compared. GDP growth in 
services (SRS 114) in the Penn-World data set and Manufacturing data (SRS 112) are 
used for this comparison. A computational exercise was conducted on Data sets SRS 114 
and SRS 112 to determine per country per year change in each of these items to see what 
relationship, if any, existed. Graphs have been drawn to attempt to show the relationship 
in visual form. Additionally a data set was gathered on investment per capita and 
investment of non-resident and machinery contributions. Additionally SRS No. 151 and 
SRS 152 data on exports and imports have been collected to see if some utility can be 
made of this information when comparing calculations across countries. Neither of these 
latter two data sets was used in this research.
Proportions have been calculated (Table 3.6) to determine the relative 
contribution to GDP from manufacturing and services for a seventeen year period from 
1970 through 1981. These calculations are based on data provided by the United Nations 
National Accounts Table 1.11 1990.
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V. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY & EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Research Methodology 
This Chapter tests the thesis posed in this paper: “What is the impact of 
manufacturing on the economic growth of a country?” The proposition advanced is that 
manufacturing is the highest value growth sector of the economy and, therefore, 
whichever nation has the highest percent of manufacturing to GDP, will grow faster and 
create wealth quicker than its international rivals.
To test this thesis, the methodology involved:
1. Graphing the ratio of manufacturing and services to GDP over a thirty-year cycle 
(1960-1990) using Penn-World data. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 and Figures Sets 4.1 
through 4.3 and Figure 4.8 lists the inputs and presents the results of the calculations.
2. Calculating the expected growth of services as a percentage of absolute growth of 
manufacturing, to determine which has more impact on the economy. This was done 
using proportional calculations for two time periods using two different data sources. 
The first calculation is shown in Table 3.6 green, and spans the time period of 1960 
through 1990 using Penn-World data for the G-7 countries. The second data set 
spanned the years 1970-1987 for the same seven countries using U.N. National 
Accounts Data from U.N. Statistical Series Table 1.11, and percentage changes from 
U.N. Historical Statistics HC 10. H59.
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The proportional calculations show actual verses expected growth of services as 
contrasted to actual growth rates in manufacturing. Thus, the resultant actual services 
growth percentage verses the calculated services growth percentage shows whether 
services increase GDP as does manufacturing for each percentage point increased in 
GDP. If services equal or exceed the manufacturing growth percentage then we can infer 
that services growth causes as much or more impact on GDP as does manufacturing, and 
conversely.
The third method used to test the thesis used statistical hypothesis testing 
methods. The validation of this technique rests with the R2 calculations.
Also shown in Table 3.6 is the percentage of GDP generated by agriculture. This 
percent contribution is included to suggest that it is so small as a percent o f GDP that it 
has little, if any, economic impact on the rate of growth of GDP.
However, the critical thought at the end of this use of data sets is that there is non­
uniformity in the data and this is a red flag in terms of trying to calculate any value with 
certainty and high validity. Therefore, the writer has really done the process two times. 
For example, SAS runs were made on two different data sets yielding different measures 
of correlation and causation. Therefore, while this thesis attempts to be able to use all of 
the different data sets, there certainly is no uniformity in the data sets in any way 
whatsoever. However, the result that each data set shows is consistent in supporting the 
thesis: (1) manufacturing percent determines growth and wealth rates in an economy, (2) 
manufacturing, not services, creates the highest multiple of growth, and (3) the economy 
with the highest percent of manufacturing to GDP grows faster than its international 
competitors.
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Empirical Results
As stated, empirical results comprise hypothesis testing, descriptive charting, and 
the above mentioned worksheet which uses proportional combinations to show the proof 
of the thesis.
Before beginning to discuss the empirical results, it would be useful to look at the 
GNP per capita over a long period of time. The 1993 Economical Report of the President 
discussed macroeconomic policy in a historical context (Figure 4.0). Figure 4.0 shows 
the increase in per capita GDP from 1870 to 1990 in constant dollars. The chart shows 
that there was a continual rise in real GNP per capita. [All of the doom sayers ought to 
look at this before they announce that the United States is slipping down the drain.] 
Comparisons against other countries, however, reveal that other industrialized 
nations’ growth other than Japan and West Germany, have a manufacturing rate of about 
twenty percent. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 describe the conclusion that both Germany and Japan 
show the greatest growth because they show the continually greatest contribution from 
manufacturing. An interesting compliment to this finding is that in both of those 
countries the percentage of services is significantly less (7 to 10 percent of GNP) than in 
the other five slower growing OECD countries. (Figure 2.2)
Next, we examine relative growth rates in manufacturing services and GDP in 
seven OECD economies. (Figures 4.1a through 4.7b)
According to the OECD charts for the United States (Figure 4.7b) and Canada 
(Figure 4.1b), GDP and services go up in almost parallel fashion. For manufacturing, the 
relationship is depicted by a straight line. In contrast, when at Germany (Figure 4.3b) and 
Japan (Figure 4.5b) are examined, we see that services rise faster than GDP, but
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Figure 4.0
Gross National Product Per Capita. 1970-1990
While there have been occasional interruptions, real GNP per capita has been rising since 1870. 
19<2 M m
Note: Trend line represnets consistent annual growth of 1.7 percent.
Sources: Department o f Commerce and Romer. Journal of Political Economy/
manufacturing also goes up in terms of real dollars, so their profile is significantly 
different. In Germany, the GDP correlates closer to manufacturing than to services. 
However, the profile is distinctive between Germany and Japan. On the one hand, there 
is a growing absolute per capita growth in manufacturing output which goes up at a 
continuously high rate. Japan has 30 percent of its GDP in manufacturing in comparison 
to 28 percent for Germany. Their share trends continue to show a significant upper 
movement as opposed to the United States and Canada that have 19 percent to 20 percent 
in manufacturing as a percentage of GDP. Italy falls somewhere in between with 25 
percent of manufacturing as a percentage of GDP. France is a hybrid in that 
manufacturing in GDP is almost constant at a very low level. In France, the relative 
contribution of services continually rises suggesting that France basically follows the
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trajectory of Canada and the United States. Italy, like the U.S. and Canada, has a low 
percent of GDP (about 20 percent) in manufacturing.
These charts suggest that the percent of manufacturing employment versus 
services is an important factor when trying to measure and explain aggregate economic 
performance. A more accurate reflection of what is happening in the economy is the 
absolute per capita GDP coming from each sector. Germany and Japan's per capita GDP 
from manufacturing continues to increase; whereas, the United States and Canada (which 
has only 20 percent versus 30 percent for Japan and Germany) exhibits a flat line for 
manufacturing GDP per capita. Since the vertical axis is not a uniform number, the 
sharpness of the axis is not easily comparable. A further modification could be made to 
make the relationship even more dramatic.
The next step was to use proportion calculations based on actual monetary growth 
over a thirty-year span (1960-1990) using Penn-World data. This approach compares the 
actual monetary percentage growth for manufacturing and services. A calculation is then 
done to determine how much services would be, had it grown as much as manufacturing. 
The results show that had services grown as fast as manufacturing, services would have 
generated a much higher percentage of growth than its actual calculation. This 
comparative figure in Figure 3.6 is called "Calculated" services growth. Since this 
number is much greater that the actual percentage of growth of services versus 
manufacturing, it would appear that manufacturing generates a higher rate of growth, and, 
thus, a higher amount of wealth contribution to each economy.
Table 3.6 shows that Canada grew over a period of 30 years about 125 percent in 
terms of GDP and constant dollars. The United States grew at about 73 percent, and
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Table 3.6
Penn World Data 1960-1990 Comparisons 
(Data Set “0 ”)
Countries
1960-90 
% Change 
In Absolute
GDP
Actual
Mfg. Mfg.* Agr.**
Actual
Serv. Serv.***
Calcu­
lated
Change
In
C:
Canada 125 172 173 3.8 248 65.4 5a
France 17.75 58.9 23.0 5.6 8 8 63.7
W. Germany 18 134 32.0 2.9 205 56.4 r -
Italy 65.5 65.0 25.5 7 0 65,5 5 83
Japan 385 1206 29.6 51 512 55.0
U .K . 70 48 2 1 .6 23 80.0 63.5
U S A . 7 3 150 21.0 23 154.0 6 5 3 397.0
* Average yearly % Mfg. contribution to GDP 
** Average yearly % Agriculture contribution to GDP 
***Average yearly % Services contribution to GDP
Table 4.8
Proportional Calculation Formula 
[To Get Services “Computed” or Calculated Value] 
(Data Set “S”)
Mfg. Avg. % of GDP:
Countries
1960-90 
% Change 
In Absolute
GDP
Actual
Mfg. Mfg.* Agr.**
Actual
Serv. Serv.***
Calcu-
Lated
Change
In
Service
Canada 93 74.85 17.3 4.6 109 65.4 281
France 17.75 .00589 23 4.4 34.2 63.7 375193
W. Germany 44.27 28.83 32.0 2.9 70.76 56.4 50.75
Italy 6 6
3 6 J J 25.5 7.0 1 0 2 .0 583 84 "]■
Japan 103.7 172.73 29.6 ' 5.8 75.9 54.9 320 .0
U.K. 700 481.0 2 1 .6 2 .0 525.0 63.4 1412.0
U .SA . 60.0 ’ 67.0 2 1 .0 23 79.0 6 6 .0 210.57
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the growth rate in services. The last column item at the right end of the proportion 
calculation again shows the much greater effect of manufacturing versus services as a 
multiplier of GDP. The proportions show that if it were proportional, in terms of 
contribution, the services would be much higher then the actual numbers calculated from 
the historical sheet in Data Set "S."
These calculations suggests that services do not contribute nearly as much to GDP 
growth as does manufacturing proportional to their percent segmentation of the total 
economy.
Data Set “S” in Table 4.8 uses the U.N. National Accounts Main Aggregates and 
the time sequence was from 1970 to 1987. This is in constant dollars in each nation’s 
currency for all countries studied. It is the most reliable data set used. However, it is 
only an eighteen year trend calculation (from 1970 through 1987). It again shows that the 
growth in services would be higher if its growth was proportional to manufacturing 
growth. However, because the time frame is shorter, the numbers are different from the 
calculation at the top of calculation in Table 3.6 and these numbers are in constant 
monetary units but in national monetary measures.
These calculations show that the impact of manufacturing in terms of contribution 
to growth is greater than services, or the services’ computation in proportion would be 
much higher than it is to total growth. The services calculation is the right most 
calculation at the bottom of Tables 3.6 and 4.8.
Table 4.11 shows a linear arrangement of manufacturing to services based on 
ranking of those components in the G-7 nations. This table and line graph supports the 
hypothesis. The figure immediately below Table 4.11 shows this in linear form.
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Table 4.11
OECD Relative % of GDP in Mfg. vs. Services
(1970-87)
Countries
Mfg. % 
Of 
GDP
Serv. %
Of
GDP
GDP
1987
GDP 
Per Capital 
In National 
Currency
: opulation
1987
(in
Millions)
Canada 65.4 421,204 25.9
France 23.0 63.7 663,971 55.6
W, Germany 2 2 56.4 505,780 16.7(E)
61.0 (W)
Italy 25.5 58.3 443,297 '■
Japan 29.6 54.9 107,928 122.2
U.K. 2 1 .6 63.4 86,225 56.8
U.S.A. 2 1 .0 6 6 .0 3,301,270 243.8
Services
Low
7
(2,7)Japan
6
(1,6)Germany
5
(S>Italy
4
(5,4)U.K.
3
(4,3)France
2
' \  (7,2)canada
1
(6,1)U .S .A .'  -
High 1 2  
High
3 4 5 6 7
Low
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The last approach to prove the hypothesis the use of hypothesis testing. Two tests were 
made. Test one essentially shows that as services only goes up GDP goes down. It also 
suggests that as manufacturing goes up, so does GDP. It is not conclusive. The tests 
results are shown in Table 3.8. These tests are based on Penn-World Data Sets 112 
manufacturing and 114 services.
Test two, Table 3.8, shows that for every one percent contribution to GDP from 
manufacturing, 3.97 percent growth is generated in the economy; over the year span of 
the data 1960-1987. During the same period services for each one percentage point 
contribution generated, there is only 1.71 percent growth of GDP. This is less than half 
the multiplier impact of manufacturing per percentage point change in the economy!
If the countries with the highest manufacturing components are the countries with 
the highest GDP growth rate, then we can conclude the hypothesis is valid.
Unfortunately, these tests are limited in that they do not clearly show cause and 
effect. Further, they are burdened by not identifying other factors that may cause the 
above impacts. However, on balance, this evidence combined with evidence offered 
earlier suggests support for this paper’s hypothesis.
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Hypothesis Testing
Model #1
Table 3.7 From Table X
% in GDP = % /(%  change in manufacturing, % change in service contribution)
Country Mfg. Serv. R2 Comment
Canada 0.1621 -1.39718 .7247
t = 0.992 -3.271
p = 0.3302 0.0029
France -0.19598 -1.54351 .6772
p = 0.2881 t =-4.930
t = -1.116 p = 0.0004
Germany 0.12416 -1.2895 .8938
t=  1.110 t=  10.487
p = 2767 p = 0.0001
Italy 0.50264 -1.2064 0.9162
t = 5.785 t = -9.16
p = 0.0001 p = 0.0001
Japan 0.60841 -0.63931 0.5026
t = 3.778 t = 2.092
p = 0.0008 p = 0.0456
U.K. N O  E► A T A
U.S.A. 0.35109 -1.15842 .8624
t = 3.821 t = 5.150
p = 0.0008 p = 0.0001
Source-- Penn World Data
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Table 3.8 From Table X
Hypothesis Testing
Model #2 % Change in GDP
r-"------"-"---- - ----
Country Mfg. Serv. R2 Comment
Canada 0.250101 0.762176 0.96976
t = 10.918 0.9570
p= 0.0001 0.0001
France 0.31399 0.95979 0.8772
c = -1,116 5.289
p = 0.0003 p = 0.00034
Germany 0.44420 0.680797 0.9151
t = 8.808 t = 3.391
p = 0.0001 p = 0.0022
Italy 0.496305 0.122584 0.8789
t = 4.366 t = 0.346
p = 0.0004 p = 0.7332
Japan 0.354676 0.435266 0.9015
t = 7.083 t = 4.036
p = 0.0001 p = 0.0004
U.K. N O  I) A T A
U.S.A. 0.291409 0.616518 0.9363
t = 5.873 t = 3.521
p = 0.0001 p = 0.0018
Source-- Penn World Data
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Figure 4.1a
Canada Mfg. vs. Services on GDP
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Figure 4.2b
France Mfg. & Services in Relation to GDP
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Germany Mfe. vs. Services on GDP
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Italy Mfg. vs. Services in GDP
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Japan Mfg. vs. Services in GDP
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VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The conclusion of this thesis is that manufacturing is the most (1) profitable 
segment of the economy and (2) has the most impact on the total economy for every 
mature major nation; and b, services are dependent on it. Further, 13) those nations with 
the higher percentage of manufacturing to GDP grow at a faster rate than any other major 
nation.
When examining Figure 2.1, it is clear that even after 1975 Germany and Japan 
have maintained a 50 percent higher rate of manufacturing to GDP than the other five 
members of the top seven OECD countries. The other figure that stands out from this 
study is from Data Set “0 ”. As calculated in Table 3.6 it shows that these countries have 
grown at a significantly higher rate, Japan 385 percent and Germany 118 percent, versus 
an average of 75 percent for the other five OECD countries.
This brings several concerns into play. It first suggests that Nicholas Kaldor's 
perception that services are dependent on manufacturing is true. Using a dual economy 
model o f services and manufacturing illustrates the point that manufacturing is dominant 
and the services are dependent. This conclusion raises serious policy questions. The 
current view—that we (the U.S.A.) are in a global economy and we are a post-industrial 
society and should be passive about manufacturing and move to services— is disproved 
by this paper. This paper’s evidence suggests that moving out of manufacturing to 
services is a trendy opinion not supported by fact. Therefore, we should not only continue 
to manufacture, but we should manufacture at a rate equivalent to the world leaders in
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manufacturing who are Germany and Japan. This would mean that our manufacturing 
output as a percent of GDP should have to grow by 50 percent, i.e., from 19 percent of 
GDP to 29-30 percent of GDP. This would, in effect, pull all the other segments of the 
economy into balance to achieve this goal.
It is clear that both Germany and Japan are not operating on a valid economic 
model. They both use a managed economy driven by national interest. They selectively 
seek to capture the more profitable segments of the world market. These two countries, 
however, are quite different in their approach. Japan tries to leapfrog technology and to 
capture new technology markets like camcorders and computer chips. (Tatsuno 1987) 
Germany, on the other hand, incrementally improves existing products. (Sabel, et al. 
1987)
Japan's posture as an international competitor, who manufactures 50 percent more 
products as a percent of its GDP than does the United States, is further characterizable as 
a national policy. Tatsuno (1987) suggests six strategies to keep Japan at the forefront of 
technological innovation into the 21st century. This is certainly not standard economic 
policy. It is a question of targeting resources for those factors that will cause Japan's 
economy to grow.
The next important policy implication is made clear in a synopsis of 
Manufacturing Matter (Cohen and Zysman 1987). This article makes it clear that the 
United States (a) must continue to manufacture, (b) should manufacture at a higher rate 
than we do to maintain our national wealth, and (c) should implement structural policies 
to accomplish this. The book this article summarizes clearly shows that the economic 
thinkers in Washington have missed the point if they compare manufacturing to
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agriculture. The United States did not abandon agriculture, it just automated it. The 
same thing will be the way manufacturing must largely go plus nurturing mature 
industries (Sabel, Herrigel. Kazis and Deege 1987). This would follow the practice 
Germany uses to get continuing life from mature industries, and to stabilize a skilled 
employment force.
Even if the national policy were to accelerate the refinement of mature industries 
and increasingly automate all industries, using some investment incentives perhaps, it 
still leaves open the question of employment. If manufacturing would represent 30 
percent of GDP as does Japan's proportion of GNP, we still would face the issue of 
employing a proportional number of people in that industry. To achieve proportional 
staffing may include more people than a fully automated manufacturing base generating 
30% of GNP would require. We know that manufacturing output has doubled in this 
country from 1960 to 1990 and manufacturing employment has shrunk 5 percent in that 
time. Thus, increasing technology in manufacturing will continue to impact technology 
driven employment displacement in manufacturing. Therefore, a secondary question 
arises. Even with increased manufacturing automation, maintaining a sizable labor force 
may be difficult. The United States currently employs about 18 percent of its' working 
population in manufacturing. The second part of the policy question that needs to be 
addressed is, how to keep the manufacturing labor force as large a percentage as our best 
international competitors, particularly in the face of employment displacement by 
technology. It is unfortunate, but automated machines do not buy cars, televisions, 
tickets to rock concerts, tennis shoes or jet skis for water-based recreation.
Henry Ford realized in about 1918, a producer needs consumers to buy products.
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If automation would be near complete in manufacturing, there would be few factory 
workers to buy the output of the producers.
This brings up the agonizing question between macro and microeconomics. 
Automation at the micro level is very productive, profitable, and desirable for a given 
company. At the macro level, however, it creates services and long-term structural 
distortions in terms of the allocation employment and income distribution. As near as the 
writer can tell, the intellectual elite of this country have not been able to reconcile this 
conflict.
Due to some continuing concern about manufacturing being vital to this country, 
academicians wrote the book, Made in America. Written by academics at MIT, it 
identifies nine policy areas where coherent action is needed if manufacturing really does 
matter. They are that we must
1. Review outdated strategies (Sabel, et al. 1987).
2. Identify short-term horizons.
3. Resolve technological weaknesses in development of production.
4. Be attentive to currently neglected human resources. In human resources, the 
United States does a much poorer job than Germany and Japan in developing a 
technologically competent industrial work force (the non college educated 80 percent of 
the total work force). Even though we have the premiere university system in the world, 
our non-college graduates who represent 80 percent of the work force are neglected in our 
educational establishment as compared to world leading Germany and Japan. In order for 
manufacturing to prosper, this needs to be significantly corrected.
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5. Overcome failure of cooperation between academia and the industries. (The 
German’s approach for mature industries is shown in Sabel et al. 1987, accomplishes 
this.)
6. Get government and industry to stop working at cross purposes (Sabel et al.
1987).
7. Promptly implement emerging patterns of best industry practice need to be 
promptly implemented (Sabel et al., 1987).
Also, the other two areas that the book, Made in America, discusses are not only a 
more productive America but suggests:
8. Strategies for cooperation between industry, labor, and government which is 
really not well done here. It seems to be better done in Germany.
9. How the universities should change.
These all are policy agenda items that need to be resolved in order to improve our 
international competitive position of our manufacturing. They are probably necessary to 
maintain our relative position in international relations as well. Historically, power is not 
based on poverty and weaknesses but on wealth and strength.)
A last thought really deals with the question of growth rate. An article in 
Business Week (p. 22), by Paul Craig Roberts on January 8, 1996 discusses this and 
makes several points of interest. The essential question is “How much growth would be 
useful for the economy?” This article discusses some of the pros and cons and the 
mechanisms that have been used through the years.
It would appear that the federal reserve conference at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 
that encouraged growth through considering selective investment incentives and
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increased investment, etc.. was attempting to deal with this issue. However, its solutions 
are far from universally agreed upon. Therefore, this question of capital accumulation, 
capital efficiency savings, and investment rate and human resource development, as they 
are contributors to growth need to be better understood in order to deal with the question 
of increasing the percentage and profitability of manufacturing in the economy. Thus, all 
of the above points made in the MIT book about" regaining the productive edge" need to 
be addressed, for us to match our best international competitor nations in manufacturing 
and GNP growth.
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Growth.” London: Routledge, 1990, p. 262.
3. Kuznets, Simon Smith. “Toward a Theory of Economic Growth, With 
Reflection on the Economic Growth of Modem Nations.” New York: Norton Library, 
1968, p. 122.
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Martin’s Press, 1984, p. 372.
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Martin’s Press, 1990, p. 303.
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7. Halevi, Joseph, Laibman, Dan and Nell, Edward J. “Beyond the Steady State: 
A Revival of Growth Theory.” New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992, p. 274.
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